John Searle formulated the Chinese Room Argument in the early 1980s as an attempt to demonstrate that computers are not cognitive operating systems. In short, although the immersion of artificial and computational systems has rapidly increased the infinite possibilities of knowledge, Searle uses the Chinese Room argument to demonstrate that computers are not cognitively independent. John Searle has developed two areas of thought regarding the independent cognition of computers. These ideas included defining weak AI and strong AI. In essence, these two types of AI have their fundamental differences. Weak AI was defined as a system, which were simply systems that simulated the human mind, and AI systems characterized as an AI system fully capable of cognitive processes such as consciousness and intentionality, as well as understanding. He uses the Chinese room argument to prove that strong artificial intelligence does not exist. The Chinese argument is based on the premise that a person who cannot speak Chinese can actually learn and become literate in Chinese by being exposed to it in a room with symbols representative of the Chinese language. It is important to emphasize that the Chinese room argument is a thought experiment. He proposes that if a person is placed in a room fed with Chinese symbols, he will be able to speak Chinese. Importantly, this person must have no prior knowledge of the Chinese language and must manipulate the symbols based on how a computer would respond. Hypothetically, by following a set of rules, the person would be able to answer questions in Chinese. Processing capabilities would be imposed by a set of rules provided to the person. The rules would represent… half the paper… and codes. With the continued advancement of computer technology, this entire argument, while seemingly compelling, may become a mute point in the future. Interestingly, this topic has attracted so much interest over the years. To be sure, this argument is still not without flaws, but it continues to support the belief that computers are not cognitively independent. Works CitedSearle, J. (1980), "Minds, brains, and programs", The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417 -457.Searle, J. (1990a), "Is the brain's mind a computer program?" Scientific American 262(1):26-31.Bridgeman, B. (1980), Response to: "Minds, Brains, and Programs", The BBS 3, p 427.Searle, J. (1980), "Minds, brains and programs,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, p. 423. Lycan, W.G. (1980) Response to: "Minds, Brains and Programs", The BBS 3, p. 431.