If the mobile node leaves the home network, it starts looking for a new router called an access router to provide the service from the visited network. With the help of AR the mobile node will maintain connectivity with its home agent. But if the mobile node connects to a new network, topologically it is not possible to maintain the address assigned by the home network. Then a new address called Care of Address will be assigned by the AR, so the mobile node needs to send an update to its home agent regarding its new care of address. The process of updating the new address to the respective home agent or corresponding node is called Binding Update (BU). This process is implemented once again if the mobile node performs the hand off. The task of the mobile nodes is to always update the new connection to the home agent; it guarantees the integrity of the message between these nodes and assures the home agent of the legitimate mobile node. The binding acknowledgment (BA) message will be a response from the home agent for the update. An attacker can claim spoofed information that a particular legitimate mobile node is in a different location than it actually is. If the home agent believes this information and works based on it, the respective mobile node may not receive traffic at all. A malicious mobile node can use the home address of a legitimate victim node in updating the spoofed link sent to a corresponding node. These types of attacks generate threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of mobile nodes. An attacker can pass through the contents of a packet intended for another node by redirecting traffic to it. This brings the human in the middle of the attack between the mobile node and the corresponding node. An attacker can also send counterfeit bindings... in the middle of the paper... in such scenarios. Using the Return Routability procedure provides good support for MIPv6 without security issues. This procedure verifies the message exchange between the home agent and the mobile node address to ensure that both nodes are reachable. Link update messages are exchanged cryptographically. When the symmetric attack is used, the response is always sent to the node from which the request comes, thus avoiding the reflection attack. The corresponding node needs to wait for the authorized link update from the mobile node. Encapsulation (tunnel) also occurs via encryption between the home agent and mobile node with IPSec ESP. Exchanging nonse through the tunnel avoids the possibility of attackers verifying the nonse message, so the attack from the visited network can also be prevented.Works CitedNEMO, Security, Threats, Attacks