After the end of the Cold War, achieving sustainable peace in post-conflict regions has become a top priority for the international community. The growing number of internal conflicts around the world has caused enormous loss of life and threatened regional and global stability. Concerns over high civilian casualties, refugee movements, and the fallout from these regional frictions have launched a new era of interventionism in international relations. Efforts to prevent the recurrence of violence and create the conditions for lasting peace in post-conflict regions became known as peacebuilding. However, building lasting peace in war-torn societies has proven to be a challenging task, and many of the peacebuilding operations conducted by global actors such as the United Nations (UN) have failed to deliver the expected results. Major peacebuilding debates have evolved around the liberal-democratic model, its invasive nature and the shortcomings of its implementation. As Chandler argues, the two major flaws of peacebuilding are the distorted conceptualization of liberal peace and the flawed implementation of the liberal peacebuilding process. The following essay argues that these limitations are indeed true and that the liberal peace model is highly invasive. This argument will be advanced using empirical evidence from the Cambodia intervention and major academic debates on liberal peacebuilding. Cambodia is the first occasion on which the UN has officially taken over the administration of an independent country to create lasting peace and therefore constitutes a unique case study for exploring peacebuilding issues. The analysis will first briefly define the term, explaining the liberal approach and the different gradations. It will then illustrate the main criticisms and limitations of the process and then deal with the case study. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The term “peacebuilding” was first coined by Johan Galtung in his 1975 work “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Peacebuilding” in which he argued that “ peace has a different structure, perhaps beyond peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking… The mechanisms on which peace is based should be integrated into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to be elaborated… More specifically, structures must be found that remove the causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars could occur." The United Nations describes "peacebuilding" similarly as an intervention that involves a series of measures aimed at reducing the risk of spillover into conflict by strengthening national capacity at all levels of conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace. and development. In the aftermath of the Cold War and due to the dominance of Western ideology, the most widely accepted way of conducting the peacebuilding process has become the liberal peace framework. The framework combines the institution of democracy, development, the rule of law and the free market (Mandelbaum, 2002: 6; Duffield, 2001: 11; Paris, 2004). because it suggests that states are more driven to cooperate with other states due to economic ties and interdependence. The establishment of democracy has also become vital because of the democratic peace argument which classifies democracies as more peaceful and law-abiding than other political systems. Themain objectives are a self-sustaining peace in which violence is avoided by conforming to international and Western models of governance. The above liberal assumptions are consistent with most policy documentation relating to peace and security (United Nations, 2004). The liberal peace has been favored in post-conflict peacebuilding because of the assumption of its unproblematic structure and its universal applicability and its Origins can be traced to four major international theories: the “victor's peace”, the “constitutional peace” , “institutional peace” and “civil peace”. “Victor's peace” derives from the traditional realist theory of peace that depends on the military superiority of a victor and enables his hegemony in international relations leading to lasting stability and peace. The second theory of “constitutional peace” was directly influenced by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and his liberal argument that peace derives from democracy, free trade and the internationally accepted idea that human beings are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end (Doyle, 1983). The third theory, known as “institutional peace,” evolved from the romanticized liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist assumption that states are capable of multilaterally agreeing on how to behave and how to enforce or establish that behavior. The last theory, that of "civil peace", is based on the phenomenon of direct action and citizen support for the establishment or protection of fundamental values ​​and principles of human rights, which extend from the abolition of slavery to the active participation of civil society in international organizations. Relations Today (Halliday, 2001) Liberal peacebuilding has adopted different approaches to operations depending on the needs of each state, the capabilities of the actors and the interests of the various donors involved. Traditional peacebuilding involves top-down approaches to development and foreign-led administration of political, military, or economic domains in the post-conflict region. This model of peacebuilding has been widely criticized as an alien form of hegemony due to its minimal local engagement initiatives. The application of conditionality to economic aid/loans and the use of force by the actors involved have been condemned as coercive and dependency-inducing. To overcome these limitations, liberal operations have involved more and more local actors in the process. This approach is known as the “local turn in peacebuilding” and involves initiatives for local ownership and close cooperation between local elites and foreign actors in the administration and established liberal institutions. Although this model follows a bottom-down approach and is more inclusive of local cultures, it still seeks to achieve a linear application and transmission of Western goals and norms in newly built institutions. One such example would be the failure of the peace and reconciliation process conducted during the intervention in Sierra Leone. (elaborated) The peacebuilding intervention in Cambodia constitutes a unique case study that illustrates the fundamental limitations of liberal peacebuilding. For the first time in history, the UN took over the administration of an independent country in such a large-scale state-building initiative. The United Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) promised a “comprehensive peace” solution (Doyle, 1995: 13). His mandate was focused on holding democratic elections between the four opposing factions (Cambodian People's Party, Khmer Rouge, KPNLF andFUNINPEC party) and on the establishment of a legitimate representative government. Other objectives included the drafting of a new constitution, control of the administrative apparatus, disarmament and ceasefire in post-conflict regions, maintenance of human rights and resettlement of refugees. What the international community expected was that if transparent and democratic elections were held, it would lead to a power-sharing system and thus help calm the power struggle and political conflict. Furthermore, the creation of a liberal economy and liberal institutions would contribute to stability and lay the foundation for lasting peace. This gave UNTAC a gigantic state-building task. The intervention initiated in 1992 can be characterized as a traditional liberal peacebuilding operation, as described above, due to the centralized and foreign-led administration, minimal local involvement, and the transmission of Western conceptions of good governance and democratic values . Some NGOs and other independent actors have engaged in more local approaches, but most interventions have been driven by purely external forces. The mission assigned to UNTAC was a form of social restructuring and state-building, based on liberal principles and the belief that the only way to achieve lasting peace was through democratization. This pioneering effort was expected to achieve its ambitious goals in a short space of time. The new government would be powerful, representative and able to regulate the Cambodian population without the need for the use of weapons and violence. Furthermore, human and political rights would be protected by the state, and liberal economics and capitalist practices would ensure economic freedom and the empowerment of civil society. Funding and work by NGOs and other independent actors would further strengthen the local population and provide initiatives for the creation of pressure groups and other representative interest groups. Indeed, the peacebuilding intervention has achieved some positive results for Cambodia. NGOs have become an indispensable part of local society since their introduction in 1992. They have helped empower civil society through their monetary aid and have contributed to the overall functioning of the liberal peace. Indeed, data presented by Pact (2005) shows that over four hundred NGOs are active in Cambodia. The task of carrying out the 1992 elections can also be considered a success as over ninety percent of Cambodians voted to elect a new government. Refugee resettlement has also produced astonishing results with the repatriation of almost 400,000 people (Doyle,1995: 371). The armed conflicts were over and the UNTAC mission was able to withdraw after achieving its short-term objectives, giving credibility to Western methods and the concept of liberal peace. With the departure of UNTAC, space was left open for other actors to take over tasks previously performed by the UN administration. Numerous peacebuilding actors have emerged to carry out organizational tasks and ensure the continuation of the liberal peace. International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, NGO groups and other international actors became increasingly involved and more than US$4 billion was donated to Cambodia in the form of financing between 1992 and 2001 (Peou, 2005: 112). These international players provided loans aimed at boosting the economy, and Cambodia saw an average annual economic growth rate of4.6% up to 200 (Sok, Acharya, 2002: 14-15). However, beyond these significant successes, the peacebuilding exercise can only be assessed by evaluating its primary objectives: achieving lasting peace, good governance, effective democratization, the rule of law, the maintenance of human rights and a powerful civil society. be a difficult task for the UNTAC administration. Although they formally succeeded in holding the 1992 elections, this was not enough to demonstrate that a consolidation of the democratic process had taken place. The elections of 1992 and the subsequent ones of 1998 and 2003 did not lead to a real representation of the will of the population. They acted only as a superficial remedy and did not cure the dictatorial elements deeply rooted in the native political tradition. Hun Sen's political party, through the façade of representative elections, has used the infrastructure provided to gain a monopoly on power and credibility. 11This event did not resonate with the Khmer Rouge party, which voluntarily distanced itself from the peace process, accusing the National Council of Cambodia of concealing abuses of power and a lack of legitimate representation. Indeed, despite the official election resultsAfter bringing King Sihanouk to the top of the Cambodian administration, Hun Sen continued to influence the direction of politics and in 1997 possessed enough power to carry out a coup. In the following elections and with the fear of defeat he managed to destroy the two most powerful opposition parties, namely the Sam Rainsy Party and FUNCINPEC, to cheat the system once again. Discontent with the malfunctioning of the democratic system is evident in Sam Rainsy's statement: as a fake democracy, Cambodia is a country with only a democratic facade made up of apparently democratic institutions, which in reality function in the most autocratic way (Phnom Penh Post, 2005). These instabilities in the democratization process can be attributed to the uniqueness of Cambodia's traditional political system in which power and violence often converge. International actors often fail to embrace or build on the existing political or economic practices of local populations during the peacebuilding process. As in the case of Cambodia, indigenous structures were discarded as completely dysfunctional, even if some of them were actually suited to local needs. As a result, foreign models of governance/institutions were favored and liberal peace practices were deemed a necessary remedy. Foreign actors saw the indigenous political/economic landscape as a complete blank slate ready to take on their own ideas of governance to achieve lasting peace. This oversimplification and disregard for local dynamics undermined the effectiveness of UNTAC's mission. Cambodia's conflict was essentially a competition between the four warring parties for a monopoly on political power, military and economic resources. The recommended liberal model of governance allowed exactly this, under the assumption that the democratically elected government would be impartial, without aspirations of exploiting power. As Roberts (2001: 32) argues, elections 'simply changed the vehicle for communicating hostility and confrontation, from war to elections'. The struggle for power has not essentially stopped but rather facilitated by the creation of foreign institutions. These abuses of power and the clear failures of democratic institutions led to the conclusion that strong international involvement was still necessary after the departure of UNTAC. International donors, NGOs andother agencies filled the space left by the UN-led administration and acted as a support mechanism to uphold the imposed liberal model. Frustration caused by government inefficiency and the epidemic of corruption leads donors to direct their funding to NGOs rather than state authorities. This once again limited the state's ability to manage its affairs without further intervention. Limited indigenous involvement further compounds the problem as the government is deprived of the knowledge and skills needed to carry out its tasks independently in the future. Corruption and failure of local administration have led the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to impose conditions on their monetary loans. (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2003). This strategy often results in a further loss of a state's authority to direct its economy as loans are accompanied by predetermined economic policies. Regarding the rule of law in post-intervention Cambodian society, the problem of corruption is once again present. The country's hierarchical social and political infrastructure allows for deception at every level of daily life in Cambodia. A study by the Center for Social Development revealed that even in the aftermath of the intervention, corrupt practices extended from public services to education and judicial institutions (Nissen, 2005). The monopoly of power, favored by democratization, has allowed a further development of patronage and top-down networks. These corrupt practices are obviously observed in Western countries too and are inevitable insects of liberalism, but their development in low-resource environments makes the problem even more serious. Cronyism and clientelism were therefore not aided by the intervention but rather further encouraged by the monopoly on power. Human rights have also had a somewhat problematic application in Cambodian society. Although UNTAC's mandate centered on the promotion of human rights, some figures failed to take root in this post-conflict environment. The reports highlight serious political and human rights shortcomings in the country. According to a CSD study, the judiciary is among the worst and most dishonest institutions, followed by the police and customs. (Nissen, 2005:101). These problems triggered greater interventionism by the United Nations, which launched a development assistance framework for Cambodia in 2006-2010. The self-sustaining promise of the liberal peace initiative has therefore failed to ensure the promotion of human rights without the need for foreign assistance or supervision. Difficulty maintaining human rights is a common pattern in international intervention efforts. Despite dysfunctional infrastructure and/or corruption that hinders their promotion, human rights as conceived by the West are not always what local people imagine. There is a common misconception about the universal applicability or desire of such standards. In many cases, such as in Cambodia, the indigenous population has had a different understanding of what rights are and therefore Western models are not required in such environments. Differences in education, cultural experience, or local elite structures create this gap between what the West expects and what civil society demands. Furthermore, regarding liberal economic principles, Cambodia once again failed to achieve the expected economic results. prosperity. The democratization of markets depends to a large extent on healthy competition between actors, but in the Cambodian context this.