Human beings have physical bodies that can be observed, studied, and predicted. The same cannot be said of the human mind. It's such an intricate and complex thing and it personally affects every individual on the planet. For centuries philosophers have been puzzled by its nature. Questions about whether or not a soul exists, what its relationship is to the body, and how the brain contributes to the mind have perplexed us for millennia. These seemingly unsolvable puzzles are collectively referred to as the mind-body problem. Many of the theories stated by philosophers fail to solve this problem. The most pragmatic solution to the mind-body problem comes not from these philosophers, but from a religious philosophy offered by Mormonism. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essayOne of the first philosophers to attempt to solve the mind-body problem was René Descartes. He tried to fully understand the nature of his mind, what exactly it was that allowed him to reason and think. After much contemplation, he came to the conclusion that man was a dualistic being, composed of a material body and an immaterial soul. This theory, called dualism, holds that the soul does not occupy space, is not composed of matter and is an immortal entity. The soul is compared to a ghost that resides in and operates the body, a complex machine. He maintains that the soul does not “lodge in the human body exactly like the pilot of a ship, … but that it is necessary that it be united and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours.” , and this constitutes a true man” (Descartes 278). He also states that “the soul is by nature entirely independent of the body, and that consequently it is not capable of dying with the latter” (Descartes 278). Descartes' theory implies a life after mortal death; an immaterial soul cannot be damaged or destroyed once separated from its physical shell. This tip is aimed at people of faith. However, this dualistic theory presents a problem. If the soul is immaterial, it cannot occupy time or space. Yet individual minds appear to exist only within the bodies to which they are connected, and the mind and body function in direct cooperation with each other. An immaterial mind cannot occupy time or space, yet our minds exist within our bodies and our timelines. Descartes' theory also states that the body and soul interact, but does not say how; he states that it occurs in the pineal gland of the brain, but how exactly this interaction occurs is simply a mystery to be solved. Dualism does not seem to adequately answer questions about the mind-body problem. After realizing that Descartes' dualism failed to solve the mind-body problem, philosophers began investigating another theory: phenomenology, or materialism. The basis of materialism is that humans do not have immaterial minds or souls, but rather experience thought as a result of physical processes. A branch of phenomenology, called Epiphenomenology, takes all this to its extreme consequences. David Chalmers posited the possibility that material substance is the only “mind,” since humans have no consciousness or higher-order cognition. He explains that people could function like computers, providing only pre-programmed responses to external stimuli. In essence, he theorized that there is no such thing as mind; Human beings are simply machines programmed to give appropriate responses to environmental factors. However, there is one aspect of the human mind that epiphenomenology fails to explain: mental statesaltered. A person may become lost in thought, thinking only of memories or imaginary situations of things to come, and then suddenly become acutely aware of himself and his surroundings. If epiphenomenalism were true, nothing of the sort could possibly occur; epiphenomenological beings have no higher-order cognition and therefore cannot experience any self-awareness. Individual experience and a distinct sense of self effectively disprove the veracity of this theory. Another branch of materialism, called behaviorism, ties the meaning of the mind to human behaviors, which are testable and observable. Jerome Shaffer points out that this behaviorist theory is inadequate because “behavior and behavioral dispositions do not provide an exhaustive analysis of… mentalistic terms” (Shaffer 285). It is clear that human beings do not actively manifest every thought that enters their mind; behavior and mind are not the same thing. Shaffer presents identity theory as an alternative. Instead of tying mind to behavior, tie mind to matter. He says that “thoughts, feelings, desires, and the rest of the so-called mental phenomena are identical with states and processes of the body” (Shaffer 285). In essence, it states that thoughts are not just caused by the activation of synapses within the brain, but that they are themselves synaptic activations. This solves the problem of a mysterious, unobservable soul that is the root of the mind, since synaptic activity is something that can be studied and monitored with medical technology. Identity theory, however, has problems of its own. Paul Churchland states, “We don't know enough about the intricate workings of the brain to actually establish the relevant identities” (Churchland 317). Identity theorists argue that the mind is made up of physical events that happen in the brain, but no one knows enough about brain functions to pinpoint exactly what these events are and what thoughts they cause. Triggering synaptic firing at a particular location in a person's brain might cause them to recall a certain memory, but triggering activity at the same location in another person's brain will not cause the same memory to resurface. This inconsistency is not adequately explained by identity theory. Another big problem with identity theory is the fact that thoughts and neural functions are observed to be two very different things. A person experiences their thoughts as memories, wishes, wishes, regrets and emotions. You don't think, “Several synapses just fired in my prefrontal cortex.” Rather, you might think, “That was a nice trip to the beach. How I would love to go back.” The person experiences “a domain of thoughts, sensations, and emotions, not a domain of electrochemical impulses in a neural network” (Churchland 319). Perhaps the biggest problem with identity theory is the fact that synaptic activation and thinking do not occur simultaneously; there is a gap between the time a synapse fires and the time a person experiences thought. If identity theory were true, a synaptic activation and a thought would be the same thing, meaning they should occur at exactly the same time (Cook). Identity theory was an attempt to solve the mind-body problem in a way that would negate the problems posed by dualism and behaviorism. Shaffer does not believe that identity theory is anything more than a reasonable explanation for a set of observations; he admits that dualism is still entirely within the realm of the possible. Ultimately, Shaffer was not entirely satisfied with this theory either, admitting that“there are grave difficulties in attempting to defend such identification” (Shaffer 291). Perhaps there is another approach to addressing the mind-body problem. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints offers an explanation of the nature of the soul that appears to answer questions left unanswered by other theories. This “Mormon phenomenology” combines dualism and phenomenology by asserting that there is, in fact, a soul, and it is, in fact, composed of a material substance. Churchland came closer to this idea than most non-Mormon philosophers with his concept of substance dualism: "...the ghost [in the machine] is a spiritual substance, unlike physical matter in its internal constitution, but fully possessing spatial properties” (Churchland 307). He continues to speculate on the possibility that “…the interaction [between brain and mind] can perhaps be understood in terms of energy exchange in a form that our science has not yet recognized. or understood" (Churchland 308). Mormon theology teaches that humans are tripartite beings, composed of body, intelligence, and spirit. Both intelligence and spirit are composed of matter. What philosophers call phenomena of mind – self-consciousness , thoughts, memories, feelings, desires, and sensations – are attributed to intelligence and spirit by Mormon phenomenology Essentially, the mind is a larger physical entity composed of a material intelligence and a material spirit or soul. The Mormon prophet Joseph Smith received the revelation recorded in Doctrine and Covenants 131:7-8, which states: “There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is finer or purer and can only be discerned with purer eyes; We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we will see that it is all matter.” These Mormon scripture verses align with Churchland's speculations regarding substance dualism. Spirit is made of pure, refined matter that cannot be seen or studied using today's scientific technology. The fact that we are not yet able to see this spiritual matter does not deny the possibility of its existence; we cannot see the particle that causes the force of gravity, yet the evidence leads us to believe in its reality. The same is true of the spirit; compelling evidence is sufficiently persuasive to inductively support its existence. The Mormon notion of the soul includes the idea that it is eternal, not unlike Descartes' notion of an immortal soul. “Man also was in the beginning with God. Intelligence…is not created nor made, nor can it be” (D&C 93:29). Our intelligences and our spirits have always existed. If intelligence cannot be created, it is reasonable to say that, like matter, it cannot be destroyed. Mormon phenomenology holds that spirits are eternal and therefore will continue to live after the death of physical bodies. “Because man is spirit. The elements are eternal, and the spirit and the element, inseparably connected, receive a fulness of joy” (D&C 93:33). During this life, the spirit and the body are inseparably connected. The spirit and body are intertwined and constitute a single physical entity with a distinct identity. This notion solves the problem of Descartes' mysterious and independent soul and the “ghost in the machine” explanation. The mind-body problem “is answered by the material nature of the spirit” (Riddle 1079). Descartes' dualist theory suggests that body and spirit are two separate parts of a single being, but this raises the question of how an immaterial soul can occupy time and space. It does not provide an adequate explanation of how the soul would be linked to the body or how the two would interact. Mormon phenomenology states that the body is.