Most people would agree that lying to a murderer about the whereabouts of his victim in order to save a life is morally permissible, but Kant famously insisted on fact that even in this case, lying is unacceptable. Some cite this rejection as a failure of his moral system, for surely no system would so easily ignore the value of human life. In this article I will address this objection and show how, despite this, Kant's categorical imperative should not be rejected. I will begin by addressing Kant's strongest argument for telling the truth to a known murderer and demonstrating why it fails. Next, I will evaluate the argument that universalizing the principle of lying to save lives is consistent with the categorical imperative, showing why it fails. I will therefore argue that lying to save lives is consistent with the categorical imperative, not because it satisfies the imperative's three criteria, but because the murderer sacrificed his rationality in his pursuit of murder, thus abdicating the right to truth afforded to the rational imperative. beings under the categorical imperative. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay To understand the objection to Kant's categorical imperative, a brief discussion of it is helpful. Categorical imperatives can be distinguished from hypothetical imperatives in that they should be willed for their own sake, not for the ends they achieve. Kant's categorical imperative then requires that men "act only according to that maxim by which one can at the same time will it to become a universal law" (30). In short, as rational beings, we are expected to act as we would ask others if they were in our position, otherwise we act out of our own selfish interest, which is not necessarily in line with morality. This results in two other formulas of the categorical imperative: the humanity formula, which states that we should treat people “as ends and never simply as means,” and the realm of ends formula, which requires that our actions be consistent with a “systematic union of different rational beings through common laws” (36, 39). In this system, lying is wrong because it violates the main criteria of the categorical imperative. First, lying cannot be universalized because to do so would be counterproductive. As Kant says, lying to achieve an end would be "impossible, since no one would believe what is promised to him, but would simply laugh at all these statements as empty pretenses" (31). In other words, in a world where lying is commonly accepted, no one would trust what they are told and therefore lying would not achieve the purposes for which it was designed. Secondly, deceiving someone to achieve an end does not respect their autonomy because it is being used. as a means, which violates the second formula – the formula of humanity – and therefore makes the attainment of the realm of ends impossible. Therefore, in a world where lying was allowed, no one would believe everything they hear, making that world dysfunctional, and humans would be used as means to the ends of others, which would violate their autonomy, which are two strong reasons for Kant's categorical imperative. to avoid lying at all times. Naturally, the question then arises of how Kant's moral system handles the objection that it seems permissible, if not obligatory, to lie in certain circumstances. A common form of this objection, which I will use in the rest of this article, uses the example of the Nazis and a man who hid Jews from them to save themlife. In this scenario, a member of the Gestapo shows up at the man's door looking for Jews, asking if there are any in the house. In this case, our intuition might lead us to conclude that he has an obligation to lie to the Nazi to save the lives of the Jews. If we accept Kant's categorical imperative, however, we are forbidden to lie even in this circumstance, since the categorical imperative is absolute. Since the value of human life seems more valuable than the individual's right to be treated as an end in all cases, many cite this case as an example where the categorical imperative fails. Since it is an absolute system, the integrity of the entire categorical imperative seems to be called into question if this exception is allowed. In response to this objection, Kant insists that “the truthfulness of statements which cannot be avoided is a formal duty of man to all. , however great the disadvantage that may result for him or anyone else" (64). In other words, the man hiding the Jews must tell the truth to the Nazis, even if it means the deaths of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis. His justification for this position, however, is unsatisfactory. Kant argues that a rational agent does not take responsibility for the actions of another if he acts honestly. In this case, the act of telling the truth to the Nazis alone is not inherently wrong, just the Nazis' decision to round up the Jews is wrong. The Nazi's actions, however, are determined solely by him and therefore the moral wrongness of such actions can be traced back to him. If the man lies to the Nazis, however, then he has not treated the Nazis as an end but as a means to his goal of protecting the Jews. And according to Kant, he is therefore responsible for any action taken by the Nazi because man artificially created the conditions to which the Nazi is responding. While this response falls within the framework of the imperative, a man handing Jews over to the Nazis for the sake of preserving his own moral innocence does not seem like a compelling reason to accept the death of an innocent person, much less other innocent people. For this reason, many have resorted to alternative explanations, even attempting to argue that Kant was wrong to absolutely forbid lying under the categorical imperative. One such argument holds that the categorical imperative is valid in the face of this objection because it actually allows man to hide Jews in order to lie to the Nazis. The trick, the argument goes, is to redefine the maxim so that it is more narrowly universally intended. In other words, the man who lies to the Nazis does so to save lives, so suppose we universalize the principle of lying to save lives. On the surface, this principle seems to stand the test of the formula of universal law and even the formula of humanity. Because the opportunity to lie to save lives presents itself so rarely, trust will remain intact because all other cases will require honesty, so the world will continue to function. Since people will have to tell the truth in all cases where their lives are not at stake, this will also virtually eliminate the risk of people being used as means to ends. Therefore, defining the principle as lying to save lives seems to suggest that lying in this case does not constitute an exception to the categorical imperative but is rather understood by it. Unfortunately, this answer, however, does not actually pass the test of the universal law formula. While it is true that people would tell the truth in virtually every conceivable circumstance, which would keep trust intact, the goal of this principle is to save lives. As such,..