We perceive the world as colourful: but there are no colors in the world. That we perceive the world as colorful is considered trivial, so in this essay I will focus mainly on this last statement, “there are no colors in the world”. There are two philosophical positions compatible with this statement. The first is an error theory known as Eliminativism and the second is subjectivism. There are two reasons people give for saying there are no colors in the world. The first is that science has not proven that such things exist in the world: this reason is compatible with both views above; the second is that colors are essentially an optical illusion, caused by a systematic error in the visual processing system: this reason is put forward above all by Eliminativists. I will now analyze these reasons to see if they are sufficient to draw the conclusion that “there are no colors in the world”. Since the first of these reasons supports both theories, we will start there, but first I would like to clarify the terminology a little so as not to confuse the concepts we are talking about. First, this essay is not about the dualist theory of mind; in a certain sense the subjectivists we are talking about believe that the mind is part of the world, and they are realists in the sense that they think that there is an external world. Secondly, because of the above, some people might think that subjectivism contradicts itself, because if it is true that the mind exists in the world and the subjectivist believes that colors are in the mind, then he believes that colors exist in the world. . but the subjectivist is trying to say something more subtle, the subjectivist is trying to say that I... middle of paper..., this shows that theeliminativist has yet to find a plausible theory for this which is testable. if it can offer a solution to these problems then I think they have valid reasons to say that colors do not exist in the world, but for the reason stated above I find this philosophical position implausible and therefore not yet convincing. In conclusion. I think the subjectivist is too hasty in suggesting that colors do not exist in the world: despite all the negative outcomes, we still cannot claim that there are no colors in the world, the most we can say is that we don't know. The eliminativist theory on the other hand, although it has the advantage that, if it were true, we could certainly conclude that colors do not exist in the world, seems implausible because it does not satisfy what Logue (2013, p5 and p16) calls the desired ecumenism.