Saul Kripke and WV Quine argue that there are no facts about meaning. Perhaps their strongest argument for rejecting this claim is through their accounts that facts are determined by rules and that meaning is lost in translation. Kripke relies on facts about rules for his skeptical solution to Wittgenstein's explanation that every course of action is conducted in accordance with a rule. Quine bases his argument on the use of translation; states that there are no facts about the meaning because there is no correct translation of one sentence into another. In this article, I will argue that on both Kripke's and Quine's accounts, Kripke provides us with a substitution that makes us a little less worried about falling completely into skepticism than Quine's account does. I will then provide a possible solution that may help dissolve Quine's disturbing skepticism. In “On Rules and Private Language,” Saul Kripke argues that the meaning of a certain thing is determined by facts concerning the rules for the use of that certain thing in the linguistic community to which it belongs. He begins with Wittgenstein's paradox, “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be conducted in accordance with the rule” (Kripke, 627). The distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule is that the latter does not interpret any violation of the rule. To find a solution to Wittgenstein's paradox, Kripke provides a skeptical solution that forces him to consider a calculation. Use "68+57" as an example. He says that the meaning of “more” consists in the rules of addition; it is acceptable to pronounce '68+57=125' but it is unacceptable to pronounce '68+57=5' because with the latter one does not act in ac...... middle of paper...... delay a sentence or a phrase. My response is that, even if one cannot interpret the speaker's intention, claiming that there is no fact about meaning is fallible. The fact that one is able to interpret the speaker's intention does not necessarily mean that there is no meaning behind the expression, say for example "gavagai". Whatever the meaning of “gavagai,” it depends solely on the usage and intention of the speaker. So, the skeptic's argument will not succeed, and so this line of response to my argument fails. In conclusion, I have argued that the skeptical claim that there is no fact about meaning is fallible on both Kripke's and Quine's accounts. , Quine's skeptical statement is slightly more worrying than Kripke's and to dissolve his statement, I have provided a possible suggestion that may help him get out of his hole.