Nicholas Malebranche and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz share faith in an infinitely benevolent, wise and omnipotent God. This belief requires them to face the seeming impossibility of the existence of a supremely good God and the simultaneous existence of evil. If the God described by the two philosophers existed, he would necessarily have both the desire to free the world from evil and the power to do so. Obviously the world contains evil, which is a fact that could lead to the conclusion that God does not exist or is morally imperfect and His power is not absolute. Despite their common concept of God, Malebranche and Leibniz differ slightly in their theodicy, or theistic justification of evil. In this article I will discuss Malebranche and Leibniz's solutions to the problem of evil and argue that Leibniz's explanation is more plausible based on his argument for the best possible world and his appeal to logical reasoning. Malebranche's occasionalism, the doctrine that God is the sole cause of every effect, plays an important role in his theodicy. He argues that to understand the existence of evil it is necessary to look beyond precise details and features of the immediate world and focus on the methods by which the universe is created and preserved in its entirety. While God takes into account the end result of His perfection, He also looks at how those results were achieved. Simplicity, uniformity, and universality are central characteristics of God's nature, and God must act in accordance with these perfections. Malebranche explains that “His ways must bear the character of His attributes, as well as His work. It is not enough that his work honors him with its excellence; it's not... middle of the paper... I chose the most perfect thing, as he does with all the other choices. I believe Leibniz's argument is valid because the very fact that our world exists means that it was the most perfect thing God could create. It is already believed that there are infinite universes to choose from, and the kind and rational God chose one; it would only make sense that the universe He chose was the best possible. If God chose a universe that wasn't so perfect, then God wouldn't be good, he wouldn't have the idea of ​​a world, and he wouldn't be reasonable. Leibniz states that the reason behind God's choice of the world was its "fitness, or in the degree of perfection which these worlds contain" (Worldology, sec. 54). Therefore, a world's suitability for selection derives from its level of perfection, and God, being perfect, would choose the most perfect world..