Statesmen vs. WarlordsPerhaps no event in recent history has so profoundly influenced the political, sociological, and philosophical outlook of the American people as the Vietnam War. George Bell, undersecretary of state from 1961 to 1966, called Vietnam “the greatest mistake America has made in its national history” (Legacies). As the first war the United States ever lost, Vietnam shattered America's confidence in its military supremacy and generated a new wave of isolationist sentiment in the country. Distrusting the government and retreating into a state of general disillusionment, the public demanded to know what had gone wrong. People needed a scapegoat. Some groups accused military commanders of failing to adapt to Vietnam's unique circumstances; some condemned politicians for not fully supporting the military effort; while still others argued that victory would never be possible. Now, years after the last Marine left Vietnamese soil, the debate continues, but the evidence places most of the blame on American foreign policy makers. Because, as Paul Elliott writes in his book Vietnam: Conflect and Controversy, “Everything in Vietnam was seen through the distorted lens of the Cold War and against the fear of atomic holocaust” (92), Congress and the President refused to do a total commitment to victory in Indochina. This lack of commitment led directly to American defeat. But, considering the social and political situation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, was such a commitment feasible? Total victory would have required a full mobilization of the U.S. military, an invasion of North Vietnam, and the possible use of nuclear weapons... middle of paper... d. Without honor: defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1983. 488-506.Legacies. Part 13 of Vietnam: A Television History. Richard Ellison, producer. WGBH Educational Foundation.Millis, Walter, ed. American military thought. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. 480-95.Schloming, Gordon. American foreign policy and the nuclear dilemma. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987. 14-16.Sharp, Ulysses. Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. San Rafael: Presidio, 1978. 267-71. Schechter, Danny. "Introduction: The Fall of Washington." How we won the war. Vo Nguyen Giap. Philadelphia: RECON, 1976. 13-14.Summers, Harold, G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato: Presidio, 1982. 63-9. “Vietnam War”. Microsoft Encarta 1999 multimedia encyclopedia. CD-ROM. Redmond: Microsoft Corporation, 1998.