Indeed, a concept that is not the result of anything that happened before the action and which is not entirely random nor unfounded. Is it possible that the concept of free will falls into this category? In order for an action to be considered “freely” performed, it must meet certain criteria described by Chisholm. In fact, the conditions he posed establish that the action must not be caused by previous events, it must not happen by pure chance and the actions must not be without cause. In other words, for something to be considered free will, the agent must cause it and not be subject to any compulsion. This seems to severely limit what we might call free will. Chisholm also notes that it is difficult to find an event that can be caused by an agent and at the same time not be caused by any previous event. However, saying that the agent caused the event is just another way of detailing the causality of the event and adds nothing of value to the description of that specific causal event or resulting events. According to Chisholm this is frankly a mistake. In his view, the only reason why it seems at all reasonable to correlate immanent causality with transient causality is simply that we do not have a strong enough understanding of the idea of ​​causality as a whole. In this regard he offers the example of a man moving his hand. However, through this example he describes this to us